Acta Analytica is an international journal for philosophy in the analytical tradition covering a variety of philosophical topics including philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Special attention is devoted to cognitive science. The journal aims to promote a rigorous, argumentative approach in philosophy. Acta Analytica is a peer reviewed journal, published quarterly, with authors from all over the world.
Acta Analytica
Description
Identifiers
ISSN | 0353-5150 |
e-ISSN | 1874-6349 |
DOI | 10.1007/12136.1874-6349 |
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Additional information
Data set: Springer
Articles
Acta Analytica > 2019 > 34 > 4 > 505-514
Huw Price’s neo-pragmatist programme of global expressivism (see Huw Price Naturalism Without Mirrors (2011) and Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism (2013)) faces a challenge—it is susceptible to the charge that the proposed combination of expressivism with a deflationary account of semantics leads to inconsistency. Expressivists about a particular discourse deny that it is representational...
Acta Analytica > 2019 > 34 > 4 > 493-503
Many philosophers have offered arguments in favor of the following three theses: (i) A is epistemically permitted (or required) to believe P only if A is in a position to know that P, (ii) incoherent agents fail to satisfy the aforementioned knowledge norm of belief, and (iii) A’s apparent reasons are relevant to determining what A is blameworthy for believing. In this paper, I argue that the above...
Acta Analytica > 2019 > 34 > 4 > 515-529
Most epistemologists maintain that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. However, Richard Feldman is a rare philosopher who is skeptical that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. The aim of this paper is to evaluate Feldman’s criticisms. I’ll argue that Feldman’s arguments ultimately turn on a view about the relation between epistemic duties and epistemic value that is implausible and underdeveloped.